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I. Introduction
For more than ten years, institutions such as the World Bank, European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, U.S. Agency for International Development, and others have
invested significant resources in supporting the development of the Russian judiciary with
the goal of furthering the establishment of the "rule of law" (as opposed to Russian President
Vladimir Putin's "Dictatorship of Law")' in the country.2 Sufficient time has passed to allow
observers to take stock of these efforts. This article focuses on judicial corruption3 in the
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1. See Ethan S. Burger & Evgenia Sorokina, Vladimir Putin's 'Dictatorship of Law': Its Potential Implications
for the Business and Legal Communities, 13 BNA's E. EuR. REP., No. 12, at 19-23 (Dec. 2003).
2. See, e.g., World Bank, available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
IB/1996/05/21/000009265_3961214124817/Rendered/PDF/multiOpage.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2004); U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, BUREAU FOR GLOBAL
PROGRAMs, FIELD SUPPORT AND REsEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTI-
ALITY, 53-71 (Washington D.C., revised ed. 2002) (citing Peter H. Solomon Jr. & Todd S. Vogelsong, Courts
in Transition in Russia: The Challenge of Judicial Reform (Westview Press 2000)), available at http://www.usaid.
gov/democracy/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf; httpIJ/www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm 199899/cmselect/
cmfaff/815/9101202.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter USAID, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL
IMPARTIALITY].
3. There is no universally accepted definition of corruption. In fact, unlike numerous other instruments,
including those of the Council of Europe (see http://www.greco.coe.int/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2004)), the No-
vember 2003 U.N. Convention on Corruption does not include "corruption" as a defined term, available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.against.corruption.convention.2003 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). Corruption is of-
ten defined narrowly as the 'use of office for personal gain.' But such a definition lacks context. Corruption
takes many forms: an official advancing the interests of another (e.g., nepotism) or dealing with a matter in a
fashion directed by another for political or other reasons, rather than on its merits. This latter form may be
taking on increasing importance in Russia as evidenced by the YUKOS affair. For a useful framework for
examining the issue of corruption, see the Website for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which
contains links to stories dealing with the YUKOS matter. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
at http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/khodorkovsky.asp?pr = 2&from = pubdate (last visitedJan. 15, 2004).
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Russian Arbitrazh [Commercial] Courts,4 the fair operation of which influences Russia's eco-
nomic development and its attractiveness to investors.5 Despite the recognition of the prob-
lem of judicial corruption by foreign and domestic specialists, as well as commitments an-
nounced by Russian officials to address it, much remains to be done .
6
The Russian Criminal Code, adopted in May 1996, contains articles that prohibit the
abuse of service positions as well as the receiving and paying of bribes (articles 285, 291,
and 293). In addition, the Criminal Code contains entire chapters on (i) Crimes against
For the competing explanations of the motives behind the YUKOS affair, see the Websites of President Putin.
President of Russia, available at http://www.kremlin.ru/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004); Federation Government,
available at http://www.government.ru/government/index.html?he-id = 38 (last visitedJan. 15, 2004); YUKOS,
available at http://www.yukos.com (last visitedJan. 15, 2004). See also SUsAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTIONAND
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM (Cambridge University Press 1999). For the purposes of
this article "corruption" shall be understood as the use of authority for reasons not envisioned by law. For a
particularly insightful and intellectually provocative analysis of the international policy context for the definition
of corruption, see James V. Williams & Margaret E. Beare, The Business of Bribery: Globalization, Economic
Liberalization, and the 'Problem' of Corruption, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME,
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CORRUPTION 88-129 (Margaret E. Beare ed., University of Toronto Press 2003).
4. In recent years, leading scholars and legal analysts produced a multitude of works on the development,
operation, and performance of the Russian arbitrazb court system. Professor Kathryn Hendley of University
of Wisconsin has written some of the most significant works in this area, including Remaking an Institution: The
Transition in Russia from StateArbitrazh toArbitrazh Courts, 46 AM.J. COMP. L. 1 (1998); Growing Pains: Balancing
Justice & Efficiency in the Russian Economic Courts, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 2 (1998); with Peter Murrell,
Dispute Resolution in Russia: A Regional Perspective in Unleashing Russia's Business Potential: Lessons from the Regions
for Building Market Institutions, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 434 (March 2002); and EnforcingJugmes
in Russian Economic Courts, 20 POsT-SovIET AFFAIRS, No. 1 (2004) (forthcoming). For a compendium of Pro-
fessor Hendley's works, visit her Website. Hendley, available at http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/hendley/
research.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
Unfortunately, some of the other "literature" on the operation of the Russian court system exhibits qualities
of "boosterism" that often lacks complete candor. This is understandable since many donor organizations and
international financial institutions have a major stake in demonstrating through "sponsored research" that
improvement in the quality of "justice" available in the Russian courts is occurring. The situation is further
complicated since legal analysts are often dependent on maintaining good working relations with government
and judicial officials to obtain access to data and the cooperation of the local authorities in order to continue
their work. Furthermore, law firms, accounting firms and investment banks also have an incentive to demon-
strate that the rule of law in the country is improving and gains are being made in the struggle against corrup-
tion. In addition, Russia's political and strategic importance limits the willingness of some governments to be
publicly frank in their assessments of the role of corruption and political influence in judicial decision making.
The interdependence of aid donors (and their agents) and local elites has been insightfully analyzed in the
context of western advice on privatization in Poland and Russia. JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION:
THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE 45-174 (Palgrave Macmillan 2001).
5. Judicial corruption is not a problem peculiar to Russia. According to a 1999 study conducted by the
Geneva-based Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, judicial corruption was "pervasive" in
thirty of forty-eight countries examined. PETTER LANGSETH, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, STRENGTHENING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
AGAINST CORRUPTION 4 (Vienna 2001) (citing Centre for Independence of Judges and Lawyers' 9th Annual
Report (Feb. 1999)).
6. For an insightful Russian perspective on the issue of judicial corruption generally, see Galina E. Enyutina,
Komiptsiya v sudebnykh organanakh [Corruption in Russian Judicial Bodies], in 1 ORGANIZOVANNAYA PRESTUPNOST,
TERRORIZA1 I KORRUPTSIYA [ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM & CORRUPTION] 18-30 (2002), available at http://
www.mosorgcrimrescenter.ru/menu/viewer.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). Ms. Enyutina's study outlines the
structure of the Russian court system, the manner by which judges are selected, factors that contribute to the
existence of corruption, and offers suggestions for improving the situation.
7. Under the Russian Federation Civil Code, the giving of a "gift" to a state or municipal official having a
value of less than five times the minimum monthly wage (in recent years, below the rough equivalent of $60)
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State Power, the Interests of State Service, and Service in Bodies of Local Self-Government;
and (ii) Crimes against Court Processes (Pravosudiya). So the issue is not an absence of
relevant legal norms, but the non-observance and/or non-enforcement of already existing
law.' On at least two occasions, the Russian State Duma (the lower chamber of the Federal
Assembly, the country's bicameral legislature) considered laws addressing the problem of
corruption directly. This first happened in 1997, when both the State Duma and the Fed-
eration Council (the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly)9 passed an anti-corruption
law, only to have then-President Boris Yeltsin veto it. At the present time, the State Duma
is working on yet another draft law concerning corruption-a version of this draft law
passed on its first reading in November 2002,10 but apparently there has not been any real
progress towards the adoption since then.I Existing Russian legal norms do not adequately
address the problem of the "revolving door," the situation where individuals leave state
service only to take jobs with the very same enterprises they had dealings with while they
held official positions. Similarly, Russian rules governing "conflict of interest" of state of-
ficials are fairly rudimentary.
On November 26, 2003, President Putin issued an edict creating the Council for Com-
bating Corruption. 2 Its membership includes: the Russian Prime Minister, the heads of
both chambers of the National Assembly, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional, Supreme,
and Supreme Arbitrazh Courts. Its declared objective is to assist the President in developing
anti-corruption policies. In addition, a second commission was formed to examine issues,
such as conflicts of interest.'3 It is premature to evaluate whether these new bodies will
spearhead effective anticorruption efforts, or if they will suffer the same fate as anti-
corruption bodies created during the Yeltsin years.' 4 It is indeed possible, if not likely, that
anti-corruption activities will be limited to persons "disfavored" by the authorities.
is not considered a crime. See GK RF art. 575 (1996). This widespread practice may be the first step towards
more significant bribery.
8. The Russian Ministry of Affairs' Website presents aggregate statistics on the number of crimes registered
and the number of cases prosecuted in the reporting period. The data it presents does not correspond to
particular articles of the Russian Criminal Code. It also presents a breakout of crime by locality. Unfortunately,
it does not set out crimes involving the judiciary in general or the arbitrazh courts in particular. Russian Ministry
of Affairs, at http://www.mvdinform.ru/?docid = I I (last visitedJan. 15, 2004).
9. Chapter V of the Russian Constitution describes the composition, structure, and powers of the Federal
Assembly. Articles 105-108 within Chapter V set forth the process by which laws are enacted. See KoNST. RF
arts. 105-108.
10. To follow this draft law's progress, see State Duma, On Combating Corruption, at http://www.duma.
gov.ru/bot.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
11. See Russian Federation State Duma, available at http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/GDOI.HTM (last visited
Mar. 11, 2004). To become law, a draft law must be approved on three readings by the State Duma, approved
by the Council of the Federation and signed (or not vetoed) by the Russian President. See RFE/RL Newsline
(Russia), Yeltsin Vetoes Anti-Corruption Law, Dec. 22, 1997, available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/12/
221297.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2004); BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Federation Council approves law
against corruption, Dec. 5, 1997 (citing RIA News Agency Moscow, in English.).
12. Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1384, On the Council under the Auspices of the President
of the Russian Federation for the Struggle with Corruption, Nov. 24, 2003, available at http://www.kremlin.ru/
text/news/2003/l 1/56177.shtml. The timing of the issuance of this edict, just before the December 2003.State
Duma elections, may not have been a mere coincidence.
13. Aleksandr Kornilov & Sergei Sedelnikov, Fighting corruption on a contract basis, Nov. 25, 2003, available
at http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/11/25/Fightingcorr.shtml(in Johnson's Russia List, No. 7437, Nov. 25, 2003).
14. Russian Federation Presidential Edict, On Additional Measures to Enable the Interdepartmental Com-
mission of RF Security Council to Combat Crime and Corruption More Effectively, June 23, 1993; Leyla
Boulton, Yeltsin's anti-graft chief to step down, FiN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at 3 (suggesting that Mr. Andrei
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Georgy A. Satarov, President of the INDEM Center for Applied Political Studies
(INDEM), estimates that bribes, of all types, paid annually in Russia totaled more than the
equivalent of U.S. $33 billion in 2001, more than the entire Russian federal budget. 5 He
conservatively estimates that court officials, presumably including judges, annually received
bribes equivalent to at least U.S. $274 million. 16 Of course, since neither bribe payers nor
bribe recipients report the amount of money exchanged, there is no way to assess the
accuracy of these estimates.7
No one pays a bribe without expecting something of perceived greater value in return.
Generally speaking, bribes fall into two categories: bribes to get an official to perform a
task that he is required to perform, commonly known in the United States as "grease"
payments (which are permissible under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), and bribes
to obtain special treatment. In an interview with a correspondent from Novaya Gazeta [New
Newspaper], Mr. Kirill Kabanov, then the acting Chairman of the Russian National Anti-
Corruption Committee, indicated that the economic cost of corruption in Russia was ap-
proximately U.S. $38-40 billion in harm to the state and its citizens. Although he did not
discuss the basis for this figure, Mr. Kabanov appeared to be well aware that corruption
was pervasive throughout Russian society and that organized crime played a large role in
corrupting law enforcement personnel. He offered certain suggestions, many of which were
general in nature, concerning how corruption could be combated. Notably he called for a
"judicial system with clear, distinct laws, with no gaps or loopholes."'"
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that judicial corruption is not a problem found
only in Russia. 19 It occurs in most of the developing world, as well as in countries transi-
Makarov resigned since he lacked the ability to combat corruption among senior officials). There have also
been legislative attempts to investigate corruption, including that of the Federation Council. See Lyudmila
Yermakova, Senators set up commission for anti-corruption problems, TASS, Apr. 22, 1999.
15. In an interview given to Rossiiskaya gazeta, Dr. Satarov stated that according to corruption researchers,
the Russian arbitrazh "courts are the weakest component of the legal system." The Parties Are at the Helm,
Ross. GAZETA, Aug. 7, 2002.
16. Interfax, Russians spend at least $37 billion on bribes each year, in Johnson's Russia List, #6261, May 21,
2002, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6261.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). See INDEM Foun-
dation, Russia vs. Corruption: Wf1ho Wins? at http://www.glasnost.ru-indemfond/indfp2e.html (last visited June
22, 2003).
17. According to a leading international specialist on the study of crime, Richard Rose, Director of the
Center for the Study of Public Policy (University of Strathclyde, Glasgow Scotland), one survey of Russian
citizens found 66 percent of the respondents saw the non-enforcement of laws and corruption "as the chief
obstacle to Russia becoming a 'normal' society." Russian's Challenge to Vladimir Putin, in Johnson's Russia List,
Aug. 28, 2002, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6409-6.cfm.
18. Igor Bederov, Turnover in the corruption market amounts to $40 billion a year, NovAYA GAZETA [NEw
NEWSPAPER], Nov. 20, 2003, in Johnson's Russia List, No. 7431, Nov. 21, 2003, item 11 (citing WPS Moni-
toring Service), available at http://www.222.wps.ru/e-index.htnl.
19. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank have been leaders in
promoting programs to combat corruption in general as well as judicial corruption. See USAID, GUIDANCE
FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, supra note 2; OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, BUREAU FOR
DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PRO-
MOTING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: USAID's ANTI-CORRUPTION EXPERIENCE (Jan. 2002), available
at http://www.usaid.org [hereinafter USAID, PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY]; OFFICE OF
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, A Handbook for Fighting Corruption (Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.usaid.org [hereinafter USAID, A HANDBOOK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION]. The World Bank's Pro-
gram on Legal and Judicial Reform maintains an excellent website that is broad both in subject matter and
geographic scope. World Bank, available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/ (last visitedJan. 15,2004).
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tioning from a planned to a market-based economy.20 What makes Russia unique, apart
from its former status as a superpower, is its vast mineral wealth and educated population,
which would appear to make it an attractive target for investment. This means that the
consequences of corruption in Russia, more so than in most other countries, will be an
issue that foreign courts and international arbitral bodies may confront.
The issue of judicial corruption in Russia has been a factor in a number of cases heard
in U.S. federal courts. In two 2003 cases concerning business disputes involving millions
of dollars, the two U.S. federal judges hearing the matters came to opposite conclusions
about whether Russian arbitrazh courts offer an adequate forum to resolve disputes.2 In
Films by Jove, the Court found that:
it [was] unnecessary to reach any broad conclusions as to the impartiality and essential fairness
of the arbitrazh system as a whole. Plaintiffs have produced specific evidence in the form of
documents obtained from the High Arbitrazh Court's file-of improprieties in the specific
court proceedings .... 22
In contrast, the Court in Base Metal Trading granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The
Court first found that the plaintiffs' selection of the U.S. federal court system was not
entitled to a high degree of deference because the Court found the events at issue took
place in Russia. It then dismissed the case onforum non-conveniens grounds.3 In its decision,
the Court stated that the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing of the alleged cor-
ruption of the Russian courts with respect to the specific case before it.14 In neither case
did the U.S. courts deny the existence of corruption in the Russian judiciary.25 This issue is
likely to continue to arise in future cases before U.S. courts and other judges and arbitrators.
The fact that Russia is not unique in having a problem with judicial corruption can be shown by one study
examining corruption in Argentina that found that over 70 percent of those surveyed believed corruption in
the courts was the most important cause of corruption. Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption
in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 Wis. INT'L LJ. 353, 370 (2000) (citing Gustavo Beliz,
Aplicar Indices de Productividady Eficiencia en el Trabajo de los Magistrados, ExPosIcIoNEs Y DEBATES, at 39 (Aug.
1996)). A valuable source of information of a comparative nature is the United Nations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRJ). Its International Crime Victims Surveys provides a valuable source
of information showing the geographic distribution of certain crimes, including some crimes related to cor-
ruption. UNICRI, International Crime Victims Surveys, available at http://www.unicri.it/icvs/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2004).
20. See USAID, PROMOTING TRANSPAREN C AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19; USAID,A HANDBOOK FOR
FIGHTING CORRUPTION, supra note 19.
21. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Base Metal Trading, SAy. Russian
Aluminum, 253 F. Supp. 2d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
22. Films by Jove, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
23. Application of this doctrine permits a U.S. court to dismiss a case in the interest of justice and the
convenience of the parties. It assumes that an adequate alternative forum (i.e., a foreign court) exists to hear
the case. The defendant(s) has the burden of proof to establish "(1) the existence of an adequate alternative
forum, and (2) the balance of private and public factors favors dismissal [of the matter]." Stalininski v. Bakoczy,
41 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio 1998). The private factor includes whether the plaintiff's choice of
forum would unnecessarily burden the defendant or the court, whereas the public factor concerns court con-
gestion, avoidance of conflict of law issues, and problems in properly applying applicable (i.e., foreign law). Id.
at 763. The existence of an adequate forum depends on two factors. First, all the parties must be amenable to
service of process with the forum's jurisdiction. Second, the alternative forum does not deprive the parties of
all remedies nor will they be unfairly treated. Id. at 759.
24. Base Metal Trading, SA, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
25. The perception, if not the reality, of corruption in the Russian court system cannot be denied. See Enyutina,
supra note 6. See also Derek Bloom, Corporate Takeovers, Russian Style and Necessary Legal Reform (Apr. 25,
2003), available at http://www.rid.ru/db.php?db-id = 731 & = en (presented at the Gorbachev Foundation of
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The Russian public cannot rely on the promulgation of new rules governing the selection
and training of judges, or improved systems for disciplining judges whose behavior does
not correspond to these rules. Unfortunately, it remains unrealistic for the Russian populace
to expect government officials, the press, or civil society to take the lead in combating
judicial corruption.
II. A Brief Overview of the Russian Court System
The Russian courts are divided into two distinct systems: arbitrazh (commercial) courts
and courts of general jurisdiction.16 The courts of general jurisdiction handle primarily non-
commercial matters, such as disputes between neighbors, divorces, etc. Consequently, the
problem of corruption seldom plays a major role in cases before this type of court.
Arbitrazh courts resolve commercial disputes. It is important to bear in mind that the
arbitrazh courts are part of the official Russian judicial system and must be distinguished
from private arbitration, which is covered by separate legislative acts, such as the Russian
Law "On International Arbitration," dated July 7, 1993, and the Regulations "On Treteiskie
[private, or literally Third-Person's] Courts," dated June 11, 1964.
The arbitrazh court system is divided into Courts of the First Instance (trial courts),
Courts of the Appellate Instance, Federal Arbitrazh Circuit Courts (Cassation Courts), and
the Supreme Arbitrazh Court. The Courts of the First Instance and Courts of the Appellate
Instance are part of the same court physically and organizationally. They are located in
each of the eighty-nine Subjects [political subdivisions] 1 of the Russian Federation. 28 The
Federal Arbitrazh Circuit Courts are located in the designated center of each of the ten
judicial okrugy (circuits). The Supreme Arbitrazh Court is located in Moscow.
The Courts of the First Instance hear cases and make the initial judgments over disputes.
Appeals from decisions of the Courts of the First Instance are heard in the Appellate In-
stance of the Arbitrazh Court. The Federal Arbitrazh Circuit Courts are the courts of the
next level of appeal. A party may obtain jurisdiction in the Federal Arbitrazh Circuit Court
by filing a Cassation Appeal (zhaloba). The Cassation Courts (the equivalent of the U.S.
Federal Circuit Appeals Courts) have the right to suspend execution of a decision or ruling
passed in the First Instance or Appellate Instance upon a party's application. The Supreme
Arbitrazh Court is the final level of appeal. In certain instances, the Supreme Arbitrazh
Court may rule on matters on direct appeal from the Court of the First Instance. For
example, a party in a case, or the Court of the First Instance on its own initiative, may
request that the Supreme Arbitrazh Court hear and decide an issue involving judicial con-
flicts of interests. In practice, this is not a frequent occurrence.
North America's Conference on Corporate Governance and Investment in Transitioning Economies, April
24-26, Boston, Massachusetts. Describing instances of corruption in the Russian court system and calling for
the establishment of specialized corporate governance courts); see also Potemkin Democracy, WASH. POST, May
30, 2003 (stating that the [Russian] "judicial system is still corrupt" and calling for additional funding on
programs to support the development of democracy in Russia).
26. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE'S INTERNATIONAL TRAoE ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK ON COM-
MERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (July 2000).
27. The Russian Federation is divided into eighty-nine subjects, such as republics, krais, oblasts, and cities of
a federal significance (i.e., Moscow and St. Petersburg). See KONST. RF art. 65.
28. See FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (1996) art.
4, available at http://www.supcourt.ru/EN/system.htm.
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Logically, it should be easier to bribe a single trial court judge than a panel of appellate
judges or even members of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court. Nonetheless, the lengthy process
for having an appeal heard along with other factors, such as attorney fees, preservation of
evidence, procurement of false documents by the other side in a dispute, lack of a trial
transcript to help demonstrate that the trial court's decision was motivated by something
other than the legitimate application of law to the facts, discourages many parties from
pursuing appeals, particularly when the appellate court is located far away from where the
case was originally heard.
III. The Soviet Legacy of Political Interference in the Court System
Many respected scholars have written about the political dominance of the Russian court
system by local political leaders, such as the governors of Russia's Oblasts [regions] or other
political subdivisions. This local dominance is in part a legacy of the Soviet era's practice
of "telephone justice," where a Communist Party official would call a judge to tell him how
a particular case should be decided.2 9
Although the Russian Constitution now provides for a separation of powers and declares
the judiciary to be independent 30 of the legislative and executive branches of government,
judges are still frequently influenced by "suggestions" by governmental authorities, wealthy
individuals, and enterprises seeking particular outcomes in cases." The Russian Constitu-
tion's provisions, particularly those dealing with the courts, can be best understood as "de-
claratory." The section on the judiciary can only be implemented through the enactment
of federal laws.2 Although the Russian Constitution does not explicitly establish rules with
respect to the court system's funding, it is implicit in a constitutional system envisioning
a separation of powers that the judiciary has sufficient resources to perform its function
29. See Louise L. Shelley, Putin's Russia: Why a Corrupt State Can't be a Strong State in the Post-Yeltsin Era,
9 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 12 (2000); Prosecutors Say Russia Far From Law-Based State, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Jan.
15, 2001; Ronald R. Pope, An Illinois Yankee in Tsar Yeltsin's Court: Justice in Russia, DEMOCRATIZATIYA (Fall
1999).
30. According to a call in and online poll conducted by Ekho Moscow of its listeners, 96 percent of over
4,000 respondents indicated that they did not consider the Russian judicial system to be independent. Caroline
McGregor, Prosecutors Accused of Pressuring Court, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://www.
moscow, mes.ru/stories/2003/12/02/022.htnl.
31. See, e.g., Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Courts in Russia: Independence, Power and Accountability, (unpublished
paper presented before the 9th Annual Conference on the Individual vs. the State, May 3-5, 2001); see also
Geoffrey York, Canadians Red-Faced as Russians Make a Farce of Bankruptcy Law, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Apr. 14, 2001. The intimidation of judges by government officials, influential persons, and organized crime
cannot be ignored as having a significant impact on the behavior of individual judges. The methods of intim-
idation may vary from physical threats against judges and their families to forcing a judge to accept a bribe so
that he might be subject to blackmail in the future.
32. See KONST. RF ch. 7 (1993). Whether a sufficient number of voters participated in the referendum on
the Russian Constitution is a subject of some dispute. Official data indicates that 54.8 percent of eligible voters
participated in the referendum held on December 12, 1993 and that 58.4 percent voted in favor of the consti-
tution. That is, only 30.7 percent of the Russian electorate voted in favor of the 1993 Russian Constitution.
CENTER FOR RUSSIAN STUDIES, NEw FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVED, Dec. 12, 1993, available at http://
www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?910. At the time, there were many allegations of fraud. See, e.g.,
Olivia Ward, Yeltsin Faces Probe Over Claim of Fraud on Constitutional Vote, TORONTO STAR, June 2, 1994, at
Al 9 (reporting Duma initiated probe questioning legality of December 1993 vote adopting new Constitution).
In any event, almost without exception all Russian political actors have accepted the legitimacy of the 1993
Russian Constitution.
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adequately. Not to do so would defeat the reality of an independent judiciary. Unfortunately,
as discussed below, this functional independence has not been achieved."
During Soviet times, a judge might have been inclined to resolve disputes between two
state enterprises on their merits. Today, judges are likely to favor large local enterprises
over small and mediate enterprises, entrepreneurs, and foreigners, since the large local
enterprises provide employment to the local population and taxes needed by the local gov-
ernments (and are often controlled by politically well-connected individuals or industrial
groups). Thus it appears that the judicial system is stacked against non-local and/or polit-
ically weaker parties, unless bribery occurs. Judges can often mask telephone justice by
deciding cases on the basis of form over substance. For example, ruling on the basis of
technicalities to dispose of troublesome cases, rather than resolving such cases on their
merits.1
4
IV. Perceptions on the Extent of Corruption in the Russian
Arbitrazh Courts
In the absence of reliable statistics on the scope of judicial corruption, one is forced to
rely on polling data and survey research." According to Oleg Fyodorov, an advisor to the
National Association of Securities Market Participants and the Investor's Rights Associa-
tion, the Russian Arbitrazh Courts do not function as "courts" in the conventional sense.
Where a case involves a dispute between "two parties of very different size [... ] for instance,
one very influential, very rich, and the other having only the law behind it-then almost
no case is known of the court taking the side of the lesser-known side."36 While such a
remark is a bit of an overstatement, it is indicative of a significant problem that cannot be
ignored.
Numerous sources indicate the perceived extent of corruption in the Russian court sys-
tem. For example, the international non-governmental organization, Transparency Inter-
national (TI), has for many years identified Russia as one of the most corrupt countries in
33. See Gregory Yavlinsky, Reforms that Corrupted Russia, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, at 9 (where Yavlinsky,
the leader of the political party Yabloko, stated "[tihe judicial system is corrupted by oligarchs and serves as
an instrument for the authorities to settle scores by selective application of the law." Yavlinksy sees the manner
of privatization in Russia as the origin of the problem).
34. Apparently, state enterprises are less likely to pay bribes to obtain favorable judicial decisions than
privately owned enterprises. This should not be a surprise since government workers are in most cases less
likely to benefit personally from a favorable arbitrazb decision than the management or ownership of private
enterprises. According to World Bank data, corruption overall in Russia from 1999-2002 has declined. See
author's private correspondence with Ms. Randi Ryterman, Lead Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region,
World Bank.
35. Irrespective of how Russian businesspersons may gauge the extent of corruption in the Russian arbitrazb
courts, the number of cases filed in these courts has increased significantly from 1992-2001, from 497,740 to
745,626. This increase can be attributed to a number of factors including an increase in the larger number of
commercial disputes, more legally trained individuals capable of filing such cases, the growth in the number
and complexity of Russian laws and other normative acts, and a decreased willingness to resolve commercial
conflicts through "criminal" courts (i.e., organizations, legal or otherwise, that offer "protection," collection
and similar services to business and individuals). See http://www.arbitr.ru/news/totals/l0anniversary (last visited
Mar. 12, 2004).
36. Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: Judges, Plaintiffi, Defendants Face Arbitration Court Problems-Part 2, RA&io
FREE EUROPEIRADIo LIBERT, Apr. 25, 2001,availableathttp://www.cdi.org/russia/Johnson/5223.html (quoting
Fyodorov).
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which to do business. In the fall of 2003, TI ranked Russia tied for 86 out of 133 in its
"2003 Corruption Perception Index" (the higher the ranking, the more corrupt a country
is deemed).17 For Russia, this represents an increase in the perceived impact of corruption
over the prior two years. There are, however, certain problems in TI's methodology because
cross-country comparisons completed by different respondents are inherently suspect.38 In
addition, the level of corruption within a particular country will differ by region, institution,
etc.3 9 Given the ambitious nature of the effort, the results are not always clear-cut:
According to the generalized perception of respondents..., the Krasnoyarsk krai, the Saratov
oblast, the Republic of Udmurtia, the Primorski[y] krai, the Republic of Karelia are more than
other regions contaminated by corruption. More objective indicators characterizing ... cor-
ruption practices [rather] than the perception of corruption demonstrate a somewhat different
picture. In this case, the Moscow, Nizhni[y] Novgorod and Saratov oblasts, the City of Moscow,
the Chelyabinsk oblast and the City of St. Petersburg are the leaders in terms of corruption,
while the regions least affected by corruption are the Republic of Karelia, the Yaroslavl, Tyu-
men, Arkhangelsk and Omsk oblasts. If we look at the geography of corruption, we see a
"Southern belt" of regions affected by corruption, which stretches from the Rostov oblast to
the Volga Region.4°
The study did not demonstrate significant distinctions in corruption levels between the
executive branch, the legislative branch, judiciary, and law enforcement agencies by region
or type of respondent.41
37. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2003, available at http://www.transparency.org/
cpi/2003/cpi2OO3.en.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
38. In TI's 2002 bribe payer index, Russia ranked lowest among those countries ranked. That is, of those
evaluated, Russian companies were considered to be the most likely to pay bribes. While this result does not
mean that any specific Russian company (or individual) will pay a bribe in a given situation, it is nonetheless
illustrative of attitudes towards bribery of government officials and, therefore, significant. See Transparency
International, Bribe Payers Index 2002 (May 14, 2002), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/
bpi2002.en.html; see also Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2002: Background Informa-
tion, available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004); PD Dr. Johann Graf Lambdsdorff, Transparency International and Gbttingen University,
Background Paper to the 2001 Corruption Perception Index, How Precise are Perceived Levels of Corruption, June 2001;
PD Dr. Johann Graf Lambdsdorff, Transparency International and Gittingen University, Background Paper to
the 2001 Corruption Perception Index, Framework Document, June 2001; OECD Observer, "Want Data?," July
7, 2000, available at www.oecdobserver.org/news/printpage/php/aid/296/Transparenttables.html. See also
Valeria Korchagina, Russia Fares Better in Annual Corruption Perception Index, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002,
in Johnson's Russia List, #6411, available at www.cdi.org.
39. In 2003, the Russian Chapter of Transparency International and INDEM conducted a survey examining
the level of corruption in forty Russian political subdivisions. The survey focused on both "everyday" corrup-
tion (responses of 5666 individuals) and "business" corruption (responses of 1838 entrepreneurs). The survey
sought to distinguish corruption at the federal, regional, and local levels as well as institution (executive branch,
legislative branch, judiciary, and law enforcement agencies). Russian Chapter of Transparency International,
available at http://www.transparency.org.ru/proj-indexdoc.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
40. Press Release, Center Transparency-International Russia, Center for Anti-corruption Research and Ini-
tiative, Regional Corruption Indices 2002, at 1, available at http://www.transparency.org.ru/DOC/Presentation-
index-englFinal.doc (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
41. See Center Transparency-International Russia, Tables 7-2 (Indices of public trust-entrepreneurs),
8-2 (Corruption Perception Indices-individuals), and Table 9-2 (Corruption Perception Indices-entrepre-
neurs), at http://www.transparency.org.ru/DOC/Presentationindex-engFinal.doc (in English); http://www.
transparency.org.ru/DOC/Presentation-index.doc (in Russian); and http://www.transparency.org.ru/DOC/
Speczachistka-table.doc (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
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TI's Corruption Perception Index offers a useful, though methodologically flawed gauge
of corruption throughout the world. While other organizations and individual academics
have examined corruption on a comparative basis, none have been as successful as TI in
raising public awareness with respect to the extent of corruption and its consequences.
In a survey conducted by TI of individuals engaged in international business in emerging
market countries, 21 percent of 835 respondents identified the judiciary as the institution
in most need of improvements against corruption. 42 Economists have found there is a strong
correlation between levels of perceived corruption and foreign direct investment. This re-
lationship affects the behavior of domestic investors as well. It appears that in practice an
increase in corruption operates like an increase in taxes, and extreme corruption can, under
certain conditions, prevent investment from occurring (at least in particular sectors).41
Given its nature, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact extent of cor-
ruption in an institution. Although this issue can be studied through a combination of actual
court cases, press reports, interviews, and formal surveys, the results are largely impres-
sionistic and anecdotal. One can also examine what actions particular states have taken to
address perceived problems of judicial corruption. While Susan Rose-Ackerman, among
others, has argued that the judiciary is the branch of government most critical to a successful
and comprehensive anti-corruption program, the judiciary alone cannot end corruption in
a particular country.44
According to a survey conducted by INDEM, 72.2 percent of the respondents agreed
with the statement that "[miany people do not want to seek redress in the courts, because
the unofficial expenditures are too onerous." 4 Furthermore, 78.6 percent agreed with the
statement that "[m]any people do not resort to the courts because they do not expect to
find justice there."-
Not surprisingly, another survey of 500 Russian firms and their managerial staff in eight
cities, which was conducted by VTsIOM, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public
Opinion, found that corruption played a role in many judicial proceedings in Russia. Al-
though the respondents indicated that corruption played a lesser role in the judiciary than
reported in some other studies, these results were probably influenced by the fact that the
survey dealt with Russian enterprises' experience with various governmental bodies, and
did not focus on matters involving foreign legal entities or disputes between private parties
where the financial stakes were high. Nonetheless, the results are telling.
Since those who influence court decisions are rarely willing to discuss it, the best we can do is
ask how frequently others perceive such attempts. We asked: "Based on your experience and
42. Solutions to corruption (Table 6), Transparency International, Bribe Payers Index 2002 (May 14,2002),
available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/bpi2OO2.en.html. Another study examining corruption in
Argentina found that over 70 percent of those surveyed believed corruption in the courts was the most important
cause of corruption. Dakolias & Thachuk, supra note 19, at 370 (citing Gustavo Beliz, Aplicar Indices de Prod-
uctividady Eficiencia en el Trabajo de los Magistrados, ExPoSICIONES Y DEBATES, at 39 (Aug. 1996)).
43. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kray, Governance and growth in the very long run: updated indicators, new results,
THE GLOBAL CoRRUPTION REPORT 2003 (Transparency International, Profile Books 2003); see also Shang-Jin
Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? available at http://www.transparency.org/iacc/8th-iacc/
papers/jinwei.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
44. Dakolias & Thachuck, supra note 19, at 374, 378 (citing, inter alia, Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of
the World Bank in Controlling Corruption, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 93, 106 (1997)).
45. Mikhail Krasnov, Is the "Concept of Judicial Reform" Timely? 11 E. EUR. CoNsT. REv. 94 (2002).
46. Id.
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the experience of your colleagues, do you think that pressure is put on the decisions of the
[arbitrazb] court in your region?" Of those questioned, 38 percent either did not answer the
question or responded "Don't Know." This may indicate a genuine lack of knowledge or simply
discomfort with the topic.
Of those who did respond 66 percent believed that pressure regularly was placed on the
decisions of [arbitrazh] court judges. Responses to this question varied little among the man-
agers of the new, state-owned, or privatized firms.
47
In a separate survey, VTsIOM asked one question that is particularly instructive as to the
source of corruption in Russia. When asked, "Who do you think places pressure on the
decisions of the arbitration court in your region?" 48 the responses were as follows: (i) Gov-
ernor-42 percent; (ii) the Regional Duma-18 percent; (iii) the Regional Bureaucracy-
40 percent ; (iv) the Federal Bureaucracy-3 3 percent; (v) the Mayor-15 percent; (vi) the
Security Forces (siloviki)-32 percent; (vii) influential private citizens, such as business-
men-54 percent; and (viii) criminal structures-32 percent. 49 These results illustrate the
perceived influence of the regional authorities and prominent business figures [including
some so-called "oligarchs"] (the former often acting on behalf of the latter) on the operation
of the Russian arbitrazh courts.
In January 2002, the Public Opinion Foundation reported on the results of its survey of
1,500 Russian respondents located in forty-four of Russia's political subdivisions. It found
that 37 percent of those sampled believed corruption to be widespread in the courts and
procuracy.0
On the issue of the existence of political will on the part of the country's leadership to
combat corruption, 82 percent of the Russian population believes that either: (1) the coun-
try's leadership wants to fight corruption, but cannot do so successfully; (2) the country's
leadership can, but does not want to fight corruption successfully; or (3) the country's
leadership does not want to and cannot successfully combat corruption. Not surprisingly,
an overwhelming majority of the Russian population believes that the level of corruption
in Russia has either increased or remained at the same level over the last few years. It is
unrealistic to expect that Russian judges are somehow immune to an affliction found
throughout Russian society.
One leading scholar writing on corporate governance and corruption in Russia co-
authored an article in the Stanford Law Review, which stated:
[A] shareholder who sues a major company will usually lose at trial and first-level appeal,
because of home-court bias, judicial corruption, or both. A shareholder with a strong case has
a decent chance of getting an honest decision on further appeal, but that will take years. And
judgments must be enforced (or, often, not enforced) by the same biased or corrupt lower court
where the case began."'
47. Timothy Frye, The Two Faces of Russian Courts: Evidence from a Survey of Company Managers, 11 E. EUs.
CONST. REv. 128 (2002).
48. Id.
49. Id. Respondents were able to identify more than one source of corruption or improper influence, which
is why the percentages exceed 100 percent.
50. See The Public Opinion Foundation, at http://English.fom.ru (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). In the Russian
legal system, a procurator fulfills functions generally similar to that of a U.S. prosecutor. Traditionally, proc-
urators operated primarily as advocates for the state rather than to uphold the law and protect the rights of
citizens.
51. Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? 52 STAN. L. REv.
1731, 1755 (July 2000).
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Some leading businessmen and lawyers have expressed similar views with respect to ju-
dicial corruption in Russia. In a speech made at an investment conference, the then acting
President of the EBRD, Charles Frank, stated, "[w]e know what foreign investors confront
in Russia everyday, and we would like to see it made better."52 Frank explained that "[w]hen
we speak about the need for legal reforms, we are not speaking on a theoretical basis, but
from experiences and lessons we have learned the hard way." 3 This was not simply a call
for improving the manner in which business was conducted in the executive bodies, rather,
the EBRD indicated that Russia needs a better-trained and better-paid judiciary to improve
its court system and reduce the number of injustices in the country's judicial process.5 4
At an OECD Conference entitled "Corporate Governance in Russia," Jeffrey M. Hertz-
feld, one of the leading western attorneys specializing in Russian law, noted that while
Russian law provided for non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors, "many foreign
investors have found it difficult, if not impossible, to have their rights recognized, particu-
larly when they find themselves in conflict with a politically powerful or well-connected
Russian party.""5 Hertzfeld observed further that he read one estimate that 70 percent of
all court decisions in Russia were tainted by corruption. While he acknowledged that he
had no basis for knowing how the statistic had been derived, he observed that "it seems
apparent that abuses are frequent and that they undermine the meaningfulness of Russian
laws and regulations aimed at protecting shareholders' rights." 6 Hertzfeld concluded by
calling for corrective action in this area to ensure that breaches of obligations to share-
holders would be enforceable in Russian courts.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that experienced international lawyers insist on
having dispute resolution clauses in their clients' commercial contracts where the value of
the contract exceeds a certain amount (i.e., several million dollars, varying by the lawyer
and the nature of the transaction) in order to avoid the Russian court system entirely."7
These dispute resolution clauses usually provide for international arbitration in bodies such
as the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration, the Arbitration Institute of the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce, and even the Arbitration Court of the Russian Chamber of
Commerce (the latter being a private arbitral body). Unfortunately, favorable arbitral
awards are often difficult to enforce in Russia, either under the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (New York Con-
vention) or domestic Russian legislation."s Consequently, where the chance exists, a victo-




55. Jeffrey M. Hertzfeld, Corporate Governance in Russia: The Foreign Direct Investor's Perspective, May 3 1-
June 2, 1999, at 6, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/47/1921803.pdf(last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
56. Id.
57. However, lawyers may choose not to follow this practice if the Russian counterpart has no assets abroad,
which will make it necessary to enforce a foreign arbitral award through the Russian court system.
58. The use of private arbitration in Russia does not avoid problems because awards may and are still
challenged in the Russian courts on various grounds. See Ethan S. Burger, Russian Legislation on Enforcement of
Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 15 RussIA Bus. WATCH 3 (Summer/Fall 1997), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION, A LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA & THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. (February
2000); see also Russian Law, 'On International Arbitration', July 7, 1993.
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rious party in arbitration may attempt to seize or attach a losing Russian party's assets in
third countries, which have court systems that will honor the New York Convention's
obligations.
At the World Bank's Second Global Conference on Legal and Judicial Reform in St.
Petersburg, Russia in July 2001, World Bank President James Wolfensohn discussed in
detail some of the problems of the Russian court system.
5 9 He later indicated that too much
emphasis had been placed on increasing the number of judges, courts, and computers, and
that judicial reform would fail without an improvement in judicial transparency. 0 Wolfen-
sohn identified one of the "biggest obstacles to the development of legal and judicial systems
[was] a situation in which the economic elites use the system in [their] own interests."
According to him, corruption "too often seeps into the legal and judicial systems of some
countries," including Russia.
Despite these surveys and widespread perceptions, at least one 1997 study conducted
with the assistance of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court suggests that the problem of corruption
may be exaggerated."' This study addressed the issue of whether the Russian courts are fair
to foreigners-the presumption being that Russian companies and individuals were more
likely than foreigners to obtain favorable judicial decisions through bribery than were their
foreign equivalents. 62 The study, however, was based on data from less than one-half of
Russia's arbitrazh courts, and is of limited analytical or practical value. Indeed, one of the
study's investigators, Glenn P. Hendrix, acknowledged "severe limitations" in the data,
including: (1) the Supreme Arbitrazh Court's refusal to supplement the report by obtaining
copies of the underlying decisions, in part because of the financial burden of doing so;
(2) the lack of information regarding the size of the parties or the amount in controversy;
(3) the under-inclusiveness of the definition of "foreign entity" as including only foreign
nationals; and (4) the lack of data as to whether any of the "favorable" decisions obtained
by foreign entities were actually enforced. 63 Consequently, Hendrix warned readers of the
study that "[gliven the lack of opportunity to independently validate the statistics compiled
by the lower court, one may, of course, question the reliability of the data" and that "[i] t is
also possible that foreign parties win cases against minor Russian firms with little political
clout, but routinely lose when challenging entrenched interests. The data are not sufficiently
detailed to test this thesis."' 6 Moreover, Hendrix's use of the 1997 data is likely to have
59. James D. Wolfensohn, Keynote Address to the Law and Justice Conference: Empowerment, Security
and Opportunity through law and Justice (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org.
60. See Wolfensohn Warns Former Soviet Union on Corruption, PRESS REVIEW, July 10, 2001, available at
http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/NEWSIDEVNEWS.NSF/la3beeaf~ef89e208525670400
4 d59.
61. Glenn P. Hendrix, The Experience of Foreign Litigants in Russia's Commercial Courts, in ASSESSING THE
VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION EcONOMIES (Peter Murrell ed., University of Michigan Press 2001), available at
http://pewaa.umich.edu/pdf/09763-fm.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
62. While some people suggest that foreigners enjoy a "level playing field" when their disputes are heard
in Russian Arbitrazh courts, others would strongly disagree. For example, "Sawyer Research Products, the
leading U.S. crystal quartz producer, lost an $8.2 million investment in a plant in the Vladimir oblast in July
2001 when Sawyer's Russian parmer took over the company with the backing of the local administration and
the courts, which ruled the price Sawyer paid for its lease was too low." Caroline McGregor, Russia Still Too
Green for U.S. Money, Moscow TIMES, June 19, 2003. See also Bill Nichols, When it Comes to Russia, Let the
Investor Beware, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2002, at B-1 (describing Sawyer Research Products' problems with the
Russian authorities and courts in general, as well as the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
with Russian President Putin on Sawyer's behalf).
63. Hendrix, supra note 61, at 101-02.
64. Id. at 101.
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skewed his results because it was collected prior to the massive economic upheaval caused
by the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which led to a large number of disputes between joint
venture partners, suppliers, and customers.
V. How Corruption Operates in the Russian Court System
In common disputes not involving large sums of money, judicial corruption does not
appear to be a major problem. Over the last decade, Russian citizens have increasingly
begun using the Russian court system to resolve disputes. 61 But this does not necessarily
mean they have great faith in the court system. It may only mean a greater number of
commercial disputes are occurring, given the changes in the Russian economy. According
to some Russian attorneys, a judge might first examine a case, decide which party should
prevail on the merits, and then seek payment for issuing the proper decision. Other judges
will simply favor the highest "bidder" for a favorable result.
This situation is made possible by the fact that the submission of an appeal of arbitrazh
trial court decisions is often fruidess, since higher courts are not only reluctant to overturn
lower court decisions, but are hindered in their ability to conduct effective judicial review
because in most civil law systems, there is no official trial court transcript to examine.
Consequently, appellate courts are limited to reviewing decisions for pure errors of law,
and refrain from reviewing factual determinations or the misapplication of law to fact. To
make matters worse, over the years, Russian appellate courts have suffered from inadequate
technical and budgetary resources, thus hindering their ability to perform their legislatively-
mandated functions. This situation appears to be slowly improving as the impact of judicial
reforms is beginning to take effect.
Russian journalists who cover the issue of judicial corruption and the operation of the
court system have noted that Russian appellate courts tend not to be overly inquisitive of
lower court actions. As noted above, the Russian appellate courts lack the tools to properly
perform their function. This would seem to explain why, according to Russian Legal Cor-
respondent Konstantin Sklovskii, during the time period he examined, Russian appeals
courts overturn a mere 0.05 percent of trial court decisions.66
VI. Steps Russia is Taking Towards Judicial Reform and the
Problem of Corruption
In the 1990s, the Russian Federation took a series of significant measures in the creation
of a viable judicial system, such as the adoption of a constitution, providing for an inde-
pendent judiciary (1993), the adoption of a law on the status of judges (1992, and amended
65. Data on the number of cases filed in the Russian Arbitrazb can be found on the Russian SupremeArbitrazb
Court's Website. Supreme Arbitrazh Court, available athttp://www.arbitr.ru/news/totals/lOanniversary/index.
hon (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). From 1994-2001, the number of cases filed has increased over time. This trend
reflects a number of factors, including the smaller role played by state enterprises in the Russian economy and
the increase in the number of Russian lawyers.
66. Konstantin Sklovskii, B interesakb chasrnogo litsa [In the interests ofa private person], NEZAVISMAYA GAZETA
[INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER], June 1, 2001. According to Sklovskii, even when a reviewing court discovers a
mistake by a lower court, its response in 99 percent of the cases is simply to remand the case to the same lower
court, which merely results in avoidable delays (usually favoring the party at fault). Such a system can and does
contribute to corruption on the part of trial court judges.
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1993, 1995, and 1996), the establishment of a Constitutional Court (1994), a new law on
the arbitrazh courts (1995), a new law on courts of general jurisdiction (1996), and a law
clarifying the jurisdiction of particular types of courts within the Russian court system
(1996).
Within Russia, many interest groups and individuals having a strong commitment to
judicial reform have emerged. The Russian legislature has enacted various laws aimed at
dealing with some aspects of judicial reform, including provisions on corruption in the
Russian Federation Criminal Code. A federal program for the improvement of the courts
has been organized.67
Despite the adoption of numerous laws on the judicial system, Russia lacks the nec-
essary personnel to produce well-drafted legislation and normative acts implementing
such legislation. This is not surprising since a large share of the Russian legislature and
regulatory authorities are largely composed of non-lawyers with little legislative or rule-
making experience. The Russian government, legislature, and judiciary frequently have
difficulty retaining highly competent individuals, in part due to the availability of more
remunerative positions in the private sector, particularly for those with valuable govern-
mental connections. 68
Russian legislation often contradicts other normative legal acts, 69 and is often so vague
that it permits arbitrary conduct on the part of judges and state officials. This situation
gives the judiciary excessive discretion in carrying out their duties, which is often used as a
device to extort bribes. Furthermore, many arhitrazh judges lack experience in dealing with
complex commercial matters, though there has been an increase in the training of judges
both before and after taking the bench.
One positive development not to be ignored is that the Presidium of the Supreme Ar-
bitrazh Court has been issuing Postanovlenie [resolutions] that explain how particular cases
are resolved. The quality of these resolutions has improved over time, and not only serve
to educate judges on how to interpret certain laws or normative acts, but to inform all
members of the legal community (and the public at large) on important legal issues, since
they are available on the Internet. 0 Furthermore, they may serve as a tool for identifying
67. See 0 Federal'noi Tselevoi Programme 'Razvitie sudebnoi sistemy na 2002 do 2006 [On the Federal
Special Program 'The Development of a Judicial Program for 2002 to 2006], RF Govt'l Decree No. 805
(Nov. 20, 2001). Of course, it remains to be seen whether the funds necessary to implement this program have
been allocated, for the manner in which it is carried out.
68. See generally John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter, in CARNEGIE ENDow-
MENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, at 10-12 (Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Papers No. 26,
Apr. 2002), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp2b.pdf. Hewko's observation in this regard was made
in specific reference to Ukraine, but the same situation is true with respect to Russia, although to a slightly
lesser extent. Hewko, however, believes that businesses pursue projects where they see opportunity, and that
weaknesses in a country's legal structure is a secondary consideration.
69. A "normative act" is an act, in the form of an official document, that is issued by an authorized official
in the constitutionally or legislatively-required manner, which establishes mandatory legal norms or procedures.
These include presidential edicts, governmental decrees, instructions or regulations, etc., issued by an author-
ized body of the Russian Federation, regional governments, local self-administrations, or municipal govern-
ments. See Decree No. 5, Plenum, RF Supreme Court, On Some Questions Arising in the Course of the
Examination of Cases pursuant to Petitions of Procurators regarding the Recognition of Legal Acts as Contrary
to Law (Apr. 23, 1993).
70. Supreme Arbitrazb Court, Postanovlenie, available at http://frame.arbitr.ru:8080/law (last visited Jan. 16,
2004). The Supreme Arbitrazh Court even has a user friendly search engine for locating relevant resolutions,
see http://arbitr.park.ru/default.asp?page = docsearch-form (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
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when cases have not been decided on the merits (i.e., that the ruling was mistaken or the
outcome was motivated by other factors).
In his 2001 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Russian President Putin noted the
urgency of the need for judicial reforms:
We set the goal: to build an efficiently working executive vertical, to achieve legal discipline
and an effective judicial system.
Today, judicial reform is extremely necessary for us. The domestic judicial system [is defi-
cient] in practice [and] does little to help the conduct of economic transformations. Not only
for entrepreneurs, but also for many people, trying legally to restore their own rights, the
courts have not become timely, correct and fair. I don't say "always," but in many cases, un-
fortunately, this is so. Arbitrazh practice also encounters barriers such as a contradictory and
incomprehensible legislative basis. Bureaucratic norm-creation is one of the main obstacles to
the development of entrepreneurship.
Now [I would like to address] the business climate in this country. Unfortunately, ownership
rights are still badly protected. The quality of corporate governance remains poor. Wars be-
tween contenders for ownership do not cease even after courts render their decisions. And the
decisions themselves are often based not on the laws but on the pressure of interested parties.7
Today, however, it appears that Putin is less focused on the problem of judicial corruption
than was promised in this address, though combating corruption has been a major theme
of his 2004 re-election campaign.7"
In May 2002, the then Russian Procurator General Ustinov issued the Procuracy Annual
Report for 2001 to the Federation Council (the upper Chamber of the Russian legislature).
The Report discusses the activities of the Procuracy during 2001, including the Procuracy's
anti-corruption campaign. While the Report outlined the overall situation in the country
concerning crime, Procurator Ustinov painted a rather detailed and not optimistic picture
of the Russian's struggle with corruption.73
The principal Russian official behind Russia's current judicial reform efforts, then Deputy
Head of President Putin's administration, Dmitrii Kozak, observed:
There was corruption within the Russian judicial system, and said the fact that only 15 judges
out of 20,000 had been dismissed [in 2000] suggested that "we don't have an effective system
to identify corruption." In a separate presentation, he outlined measures to make Russia's
judges more accountable and a special supervisory board to implement them in the case of
malpractice or misconduct.7 4
71. President Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Apr. 3,
2001).
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newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/02/02/521 10.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) and Putin puts hisfaith in security
service, GAZETA.RU, available at http://www.gazeta.rui/2004/0l/16/Putinputshis.shtml (last visited Mar. 13,
2004).
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Russia List, # 6246 (Item 10), available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6248.cfm.
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While Mr. Kozak is trying to rectify the situation, improvement will take time and require
a concerted effort by all branches of the Russian government.
The Supreme Qualification Collegium of the Courts of the Russian Federation has prin-
cipal responsibility for approving individuals to sit on all courts in the judicial system (in-
cluding the arbitrazb courts) and oversees disciplinary matters concerning judges. It pub-
lishes a Vestnik [Herald] that contains important information on the state of the Russian
courts. In 2003, it published the following data through 2002:









These figures show an upward trend in communications concerning the conduct of judges
sent to the Collegium. They probably indicate an increased public awareness of the Col-
legium's function and a greater willingness of the Russian population to publicly complain
about a judge's conduct.
Though the number of complaints and other communications about improper judicial
conduct which were sent to the Collegium shows a steady increase, the number of judges












The data indicate that the official number of instances where judges were actually removed
constitute a very small share of the number of complaints about judges, perhaps since they
volunteered to step down from the bench rather than being removed.
The reasons that the Collegium removed judges were described as (i) violation of
work discipline (13 percent), (ii) falsification of judicial documents (12 percent), (iii) other
75. Vestnik Vysbei kvalifikatsionnoi kollegii sudii Rossiiskoi Federatisii [Herald of the Higher Qualification Collegium
of the Courts of the Russian Federation], Issue No. 2, 2003, Annex 1, at 64.
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violations of the Judicial Code of Honor (8 percent), (iv) violation of substantive and pro-
cedural legislation of the Russian Federation (53 percent), and (vi) red-tape [presumably
inefficiency] (14 percent).7 7 It is interesting to note that the most senior judges (those with
greater than ten years experience) and the most junior judges (those with less than three
years experience) were the groups most frequently removed from their positions pursuant
to the Russian Federation Law "On the Status ofJudges in the Russian Federation," article
12.1, point 1.78 Of course, these data identify instances where cases were actually brought
to the attention of the Collegium. There is no way of knowing how representative the data
are of the situation.
Under the current circumstances, generalizing about the quality of the Russian judiciary
is difficult. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow has candidly examined this
problem:
[T]here is a troubling pattern in many regions-the conflict of interests at the municipal and
oblast levels of government that work to keep out competitors. This tendency is exacerbated
by the weak and often corrupt judicial system that fails to uphold court decisions.
This is an all too frequent element in long-standing investment disputes involving foreign
investors. At the federal level, policies are often pursued to support the interest of specific
firms at the expense of competitors."5
Thus, in the U.S. Ambassador's view, a foreign investor may be unable to receive a fair
hearing of its case on the merits. That being said, even within a given judicial district, the
quality of Russian judges from both a substantive and ethical standpoint is highly variable.
VII. Final Observations on Russia's Response to Judicial
Corruption
In the post-Soviet era, local governments would pay judges significant bonuses to sup-
plement their incomes and provide them with apartments and utilities free of charge.8° This
situation has officially been abolished, though the practice appears to continue. The starting
salaries for Russian trial judges have been increased to approximately the equivalent of U.S.
$450-500 per month." This increase in salaries seemed in part motivated by the belief that
judges could not support their families on their salaries alone, and to reduce both judges'
and local courts' dependence on local governments and enterprises for financial and other
support. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the availability of opportunities in the
private sector, relatively low salaries paid to judges have resulted in the judiciary's loss of
experienced personnel."z On the other hand, such judges may have had greater difficulty
77. Id. at 67 (It should be noted that these official data may be misleading as how a particular action might
be categorized can be highly subjective. In addition, individuals may have stepped down from the bench to
avoid their removal).
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adjusting to the country's new economic conditions, so their loss may have had some posi-
tive benefits.
According to then Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, expenditures on the judicial
system were to be increased by one-third in 2004. In the fall of 2003, judges' salaries were
raised by 40 percent.8 3 Whether this increase in salary will reduce corruption or outside
political interference remains unclear, particularly within the Arbitrazh court system. As of
October 1, 2003, the largest salary paid to state employees was R27,000/month, approxi-
mately U.S.$900 at current exchange rates.84 This figure does not include the additional
cost of benefits. Lower level officials receive significantly less. Thus, it is far from incon-
ceivable that payment of a small bribe can result in the misplacement of a file or the alter-
ation of a document,85 factors that in some instances will have an impact on the outcome
of a case.
Salary increases alone will not solve the problem of judicial corruption. Russian Supreme
Arbitrazh Court Chairman, Venyamin Yakovlev, recognizes the need to increase the ac-
countability of judges in combating judicial corruption, although, his ability to achieve his
declared goal remains unproven.8 6 Speaking before the Council of Chairmen of the Russian
Federation Courts, Chairman Yakovlev showed some candor in how to address the problem
of corruption in the Russian Courts:
Transparency [and] openness of the judicial system is the fundamental factor for resolving the
problem of judicial corruption. Though the absolute majority of arbitrazh judges are com-
pletely honest servants of justice, we all recognize the seriousness of the allegations against us.
Corruption is a great evil, capable [of destroying] the justice in general. And this is really a
serious danger at present. It is completely obvious that we must carefully implement systematic
judges and contributed to the vulnerability of existing judges to bribery and corruption; however, judicial
salaries were increased by 60 percent during the year. Working conditions for judges remained poor and lacking
in physical security, and support personnel continued to be underpaid. judges remained subject to intimidation
and bribery from officials and others were inadequately protected from intimidation or threats from powerful
criminal defendants." State Department, County Report for Russia, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://www.state.
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measures aimed at prohibiting or eliminating elements of corruption. To assure the trust in
judges, we all must resolve this problem.
What is demanded? Obviously, openness. We do not have to hide anything. Justice must be
transparent. That is why we are publishing all decisions of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of
the Russian Federation in generally accessible legal databases. The process of publication of
judicial acts is being developed-the ten [cassation] judicial district courts are implementing
similar system. In the future, when we have sufficient funding, we will extend this practice to
the courts in both the first and appellate levels. Eventually, absolutely all judicial decisions will
be accessible to the public. Such transparency of our work and our decisions is the most
effective method for combating corruption. Another important aspect is the openness of ju-
dicial hearings to both citizens and the mass media.8 7
Another change proposed by Chairman Yakovlev is a random, computerized system of
assigning cases to judges, rather than the existing system where cases are allocated based
on the caseload and specialization of the judges. In his view, this step might also reduce
judicial corruption."8
Combating corruption is not merely a question of enacting laws, developing codes of
ethics, and establishing training programs for judges-at a minimum it requires a change
in governmental and societal attitudes, greater transparency, and an effective training and
oversight system, where penalties for transgression are severe and fairly imposed. It also
demands a great deal of political will to follow through on an anti-corruption program until
the magnitude of the problem is significantly reduced. In the absence of effective legislative
supervision of the courts, a fully independent and aggressive press, effective whistle-blowing
legislation, and a well-functioning civil society, it is unrealistic to expect a significant change
with regard to combating judicial corruption in Russia.
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